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THE MARE URY OF 1803 AND THE MODERN 
MARBURY 
Sylvia Snowiss* 
Of all the commentary on Marbury v. Madison, my favorite 
is that of Alexander Bickel likening the case to a tourist attrac-
tion: 
It is ... a great historic event, a famous victory .... It is hal-
lowed. It is revered. If it had a physical presence, like the 
Alamo or Gettysburg, it would be a tourist attraction; and the 
truth is that it very nearly does have and very nearly is. 1 
Marbury's famous victory is easy to identify-it is the au-
thority of courts to overturn legislation held to be unconstitu-
tional. And Bickel's likening of this victory to a military one is 
particularly appropriate. Marbury partakes of that characteristic 
of military victories that they have no necessary association with 
a claim of right. Judicial authority over unconstitutional legisla-
tion is accepted despite the claims made in Marbury not because 
of them. The chief, and fatal, defect in Marbury's defense of ju-
dicial review is its failure to ask, let alone to answer, why judicial 
determinations of unconstitutionality are to be the authoritative 
ones. Marbury is coherent only by assuming what has to be 
proven.2 
Although its victory is indisputable, it is nevertheless over-
statement to call Marbury hallowed or revered. This victory is 
circumscribed-judicial authority over legislation occupies a 
place somewhere between acceptance and celebration. I have 
joined the discussion of judicial review and its problems with the 
claim that there are two distinct Marburys, that of 1803, and the 
* Professor of Political Science, California State University at Northridge. I thank 
Larry Kramer and Douglas Dow for helpful comments on an earlier draft and the Office 
of Research and Sponsored Projects, California State University, Northridge, for finan-
cial support. 
1. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 74 (1962). 
2. For leading statements of the defects in Marbury's defense of judicial review, 
see William Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J. 1, 16-
29 and BICKEL, supra note 1, at 1-14. 
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modern one that developed over the course of the nineteenth 
century.3 The Marbury of 1803 is as internally coherent as the 
modern one is defective. The deepest difference between the 
two is that the former understood the Constitution, or funda-
mental law, to be different in kind as well as degree from ordi-
nary law, whereas the latter understands it to be supreme, ordi-
nary law. The Marbury of 1803, accordingly, defended a judicial 
authority different in essential properties from the one we have 
long known. 
I will here give an abridged and I hope improved version of 
the argument, incorporating responses to commentary on it. As 
will become evident, some of the criticism is justified and some 
reflects misreading. Retrieving the Marbury of 1803 and the fun-
damental law on which it rested is not aimed at reinstituting ei-
ther. That Marbury addressed problems that disappeared very 
early in American public life and has long been irrelevant to any 
public concern. The status of fundamental law is more compli-
cated. It is not clear that a return to the original distinctions is 
desirable, and even if it were, it is now probably impossible. 
What is more important is that differences in kind between fun-
damental law and ordinary law persist within the modern Mar-
bury and the constitutional law associated with it. The attempt to 
restrain sovereign power is and must be different in kind from 
restraint on individual behavior or even delegated power. These 
differences have not gone unrecognized, but they are seen 
through the distorting lens of supreme ordinary law. Loss of ac-
cess to the original distinctions is reflected in the blind alleys that 
populate constitutional theory. Retrieval will not solve the prob-
lems addressed by that theory, but it is a necessary preliminary 
to better theory. Without it we are not likely to get beyond the 
ad hoc political adjustments we have always relied upon to keep 
constitutional law a viable institution. 
The Marbury of 1803, to continue Bickel's language, 
marked a relatively uninteresting and minor victory, made so by 
the fact that its opponents were then not particularly powerful. It 
was a victory over legislative willfulness and the doctrine of leg-
islative omnipotence. Legislative willfulness had been briefly 
threatening in the aftermath of American independence but was 
substantially defeated about the same time as adoption of the 
Constitution of 1789. Legislative omnipotence was universally 
3. SYLVIA SNOWISS, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 
(1990). 
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considered inapplicable in the American states but at independ-
ence had not been expressly or formally rejected. Its inapplica-
bility rested in the principles of limited, republican government 
upon which government was reconstituted after the break from 
England, and in the extraordinary consensus on these principles. 
American republicanism, in contrast to English circumstances, 
located sovereignty in the people, not the legislature, and that 
sovereign was capable of limiting all branches of government in-
cluding the legislature. The substance of limited government in-
hered in rights and limits established in some combination of 
common and natural law, and written constitutions. With the 
routinization of extraordinarily adopted written constitutions 
limited government was understood to be connected to such 
constitutions. Initially, however, it was the explicitness of 
American fundamental law, not its commitment to writing that 
imparted to it its status as supreme, binding law. The significance 
of its commitment to writing was as testimony to its explicitness.4 
The Marbury of 1803 echoed the successful defense of judi-
cial authority over legislation that had been made in the 1790s. 
This defense sought to enlist the judiciary in support of existing 
principles of limited government widely feared to be in danger 
from the excesses of the newly independent, wholly republican, 
state legislatures. Although there was significant receptivity to a 
judicial check on unconstitutional legislation, refusal to enforce 
duly enacted legislation was still an irregular action, outside con-
ventional judicial authority, and explicitly rejected by Black-
stone, the leading legal authority in the American states. The 
1790s defense met and effectively silenced objection to such re-
fusal. The successful argument was first made by James Iredell in 
17865 and repeated in a letter to William Spaight, a delegate to 
the Constitutional Convention, dated August 26, 1787,6 while the 
Convention was still sitting. Iredell's argument was repeated by 
Alexander Hamilton in Federalist 78,7 James Wilson in Lectures 
on the Law,8 Spencer Roane and St. George Tucker in Kamper 
4. For fuller discussion of the status of the written Constitution and the 
relationship between the natural, common, and positive law sources of operative limits 
see id. at 23-30 and 65-89. See also Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000 Term-
Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 5, 16-33 (2001) {discussing the customary 
constftuti"il)o).the Public, in 2 GRIFFITH J. MCREE, LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF 
lAMES IREDELL 145-49 (1949). 
6. !d. at 172-76. 
7. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 53 (Alexander Hamilton) {Edward Mead Earle 
ed., 1937). 
8. 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 329-30 (Robert G. McCloskey, ed., 1967). 
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v. Hawkins,9 and William Paterson in Van Horne's Lessee v. 
Dorrance/0 among others. Each formulation, including that in 
Marbury, made the argument somewhat differently, but these 
differences were of no importance with respect to the central is-
sue. Judicial authority was defended in a two-part argument that 
started with the American rejection of legislative omnipotence. 
In Marbury, this was the insistence that an unconstitutional act 
was void. Today we read this part of the opinion as one of its de-
fects, either begging the real question of judicial review or as 
trivial. Originally it was a statement of essentially uncontested 
but important new ground-enunciation of the American form 
of limited government in which the legislature was explicitly and 
literally bound. It was a statement registering the possibility of 
an unconstitutional act-a possibility incompatible with legisla-
tive omnipotence-and the consequence that such an act was 
void. 
This uniquely American form of limited government was 
the basis for resolution of the second and more contested ques-
tion of whether judges could refuse to enforce any duly enacted 
legislation, specifically the unconstitutional act whose existence 
and invalidity had just been established. Continuing its reliance 
on the 1790s argument, the Marbury of 1803 drew from the inva-
lidity of unconstitutional acts, judicial authority to refuse to en-
force them. The assigned judicial responsibility to say what the 
ordinary law is precluded a court from enforcing an act that in its 
conceded unconstitutionality was void or not law. 
The Marbury of 1803 did not defend, and did not purport to 
defend, judicial authority to determine unconstitutionality in the 
first place. Its referent was not so much the hypothetical exam-
ples of concededly unconstitutional acts given in Marbury, but 
the real ones associated with the excesses of the state legislatures 
at independence. Marbury's examples, in their irrelevance to the 
politics and practice we know, are another of its supposed de-
fects. In the aftermath of independence the concededly unconsti-
tutional act was thought to pose a problem of sufficient magni-
tude to threaten the viability of republican government. 
The most important aspect of the Marbury of 1803 was its 
foundation in the differences in kind between fundamental and 
ordinary law. Marbury's assertion that it is "emphatically the 
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law 
9. 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 20, 35-40, 77-81 (1793). 
10. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304, 308-09 (1795). 
2003] MARBURY -1803 AND TODAY 235 
is" was limited to ordinary law, just as an assertion that the prov-
ince and duty of the legislative department is to make the law 
would not be thought to include the law of the constitution or to 
require articulation of that distinction. "To say what the law is" 
is the judicial responsibility for finality in the application and in-
terpretation of common and statutory law under conventional 
separation of powers. Finality carries with it significant author-
ity, including a law-making component that blurs the boundaries 
of separation of powers, but it does not convey judicial suprem-
acy as that problem presents itself in constitutional law. The ju-
diciary, as Judge John Gibson rightly noted in Eakin v. Raub, al-
though formally equal to the other branches, is effectively 
subordinate to the legislature, in that the power to make the law 
is inherently superior to the power to apply it. 11 Even the finality 
of interpretation that is inseparable from application of ordinary 
law is subject to revision by prospectively operating legislation. 
In the Marbury of 1803 this judicial responsibility for finality 
with respect to ordinary law, to repeat its key contention, au-
thorized and even required judges to refuse to enforce an act 
that, in its conceded unconstitutionality, was void or not law. 
The clearest formulation of this 1790s argument was that of 
St. George Tucker in Kamper v. HawkinsY Tucker started by 
stating the position of those who denied judicial authority over 
unconstitutional acts: "the constitution ... [it is said] is a rule to 
the legislature only ... : the legislature being bound not to trans-
gress it; but that neither the executive nor judiciary can resort to 
it to enquire whether they do transgress it, or not." Tucker re-
plied: 
This sophism could never have obtained a moment's credit 
with the world, had such a thing as a written Constitution ex-
isted before the American revolution .... [W]ith us, the con-
stitution is not an "ideal thing, but a real existence: it can be 
produced in a visible form:" its principles can be ascertained 
from the living letter, not from obscure reasoning or deduc-
tions only. The government, therefore, and all its branches 
must be governed by the constitution. Hence it becomes the 
first law of the land, and as such must be resorted to on every 
occasion, where it becomes necessary to expound what the law 
is. This exposition it is the duty and office of the judiciary to 
make; our constitution expressly declaring that the legislative, 
executive, and judiciary, shall be separate and distinct .... 
11. 12 Serg. & Rawle 330,350-51 (Pa. 1825) (dissenting opinion). 
12. 3 Va. (1 Ya. Cas.) 20, 77-81 (1793). 
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Now since it is the province of the legislature to make, and of 
the executive to enforce obedience to the laws, the duty of 
expounding must be exclusively vested in the judiciary. But 
how can any just exposition be made, if that which is the su-
preme law of the land be withheld from their view? 
Tucker then conjured up hypothetical examples of unambi-
guous violation of constitutional provisions protecting trial by 
jury and free exercise of religion and concluded: "From all these 
instances ... this deduction clearly follows, viz., that the judici-
ary are bound to take notice of the constitution, as the first law of 
the land; and that whatsoever is contradictory thereto, is not the 
law of the land."13 
Tucker's formulation indicates, first, that the binding quality 
of American fundamental law carne from its explicitness, and 
that the significance of its commitment to writing was as evi-
dence of its explicit content. Second, it articulates the key dis-
tinction of the Marbury of 1803, that between the judicial re-
sponsibility to expound what the ordinary law is but only to 
"resort to," and "take notice" of the Constitution. Judicial au-
thority to expound what the law is, is the authority to provide fi-
nality. It was grounded in conventional separation of powers and 
limited to ordinary law, just as the legislative and executive au-
thority Tucker invoked was so grounded and limited. The judici-
ary must resort to or take notice of the constitution in order to 
fulfill its assigned responsibility to expound ordinary law: to 
make a "just exposition" of that law and to preclude enforce-
ment of an act that in its conceded violation of the constitution 
"is not the law of the land." This was the standard 1790s re-
sponse to the argument of Blackstone and his American follow-
ers that judges could not resort to or take notice of the constitu-
tion but could see only the statute even when confronted with a 
conceded violation of fundamentallaw.14 
Marbury's restatement of 1790s sources drew most signifi-
cantly on Tucker and the conflict of laws analogy in Federalist 
78. 15 Both of these sources drew on Iredell who used the conflict 
of laws analogy in his letter to Spaight but not in his original de-
13. /d. at 77-79 (emphasis in original). 
14. Blackstone illustrated his rejection of all judicial authority over legislation, that 
followed from English legislative omnipotence, with an example of a concededly unrea-
sonable act, one that made a man judge of his own cause. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENT ARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 91. 
15. For discussion of Marshall's barely noticeable modifications of the 1790s argu-
ment see SNOWISS, supra note 3, at 111-13. 
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fense of judicial authority over unconstitutional acts. In its origi-
nal form the analogy served only as precedent for judicial refusal 
to enforce some duly enacted legislation, a refusal made neces-
sary in both contexts by the judicial responsibility to say, with fi-
nality, what the ordinary law is. 
Exclusion of fundamental law from that law for which it is 
the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the 
law is did not mean that judges could not expound or interpret 
fundamental law. I recognize that language in my original formu-
lation can be read as so arguing. 16 My argument, then and now, is 
that judges could not expound fundamental law authorita-
tively-they had no authority to provide finality among contend-
ing legitimate interpretations of the Constitution, as they do rou-
tinely for ordinary law. My initial statement of the argument 
indicated that judges could not expound the Constitution au-
thoritatively17 and I repeated this point in summaries, 18 but I also 
said more frequently than I should have that in the initial under-
standing judges could not expound fundamental law, without re-
peating "authoritatively." I also did not stress as sharply as I 
should have the most important consequence of the distinction 
between exposition and authoritative exposition, namely that 
judges could not rest the invalidity of legislation on their inter-
pretation of the Constitution over a contending legitimate one 
embodied in that legislation. It was this understanding that was 
manifested in the confinement of judicial review, in theory and 
practice, to the concededly unconstitutional act and reflected in 
the repeated insistence that judges could not overturn legislation 
unless its unconstitutionality was beyond doubt. 
I trust this makes clear that examples of judicial exposition 
of the Constitution in the early decades following its adoption do 
not undermine my argument. Once written constitutions came 
into operation they were universally expounded, by judges, 
members of other branches, and participants in public debates. 
Examples of judicial exposition offered by Dean Alfange as evi-
dence of internal contradiction in my argument are all cases up-
holding legislation under the doubtful case rule, 19 and are thus 
cases in which judges declined to provide authoritative exposi-
16. Dean Alfange, Jr., Marbury v. Madison and Original Understandings of Judicial 
Review: In Defense of Traditional Wisdom, 1993 SuP. Cr. REV. 329, 337-42 and Kramer, 
supra note 4, at 33 n.l14 have so read my argument. 
17. SNOWISS, supra note 3, at 49 and 51. 
18. /d. at 125 and 173. 
19. See Alfange, supra note 16, at 342-44. 
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tion over a contending legitimate one embodied in the legisla-
tion. As Judicial Review and the Law of the Constitution showed 
in great detail, through John Marshall's tenure on the Supreme 
Court his were the only opinions to rest invalidity of legislation 
in an authoritative but arguable exposition of the Constitution. 
The others, in a reflection of an existing consensus that Marshall 
undermined without challenging directly, invoked first principles 
or the substance of the common law of contracts.20 The only leg-
islation whose invalidity was determined by authoritative exposi-
tion of the Constitution was that dealing with judicial organiza-
tion or powers. This will be discussed below in connection with 
departmental or concurrent review.21 
One reason we have failed to recognize the argument of the 
Marbury of 1803 was the speed with which it ended the contro-
versy to which it was addressed. It did so because the opposing 
position was exceedingly weak. As Tucker's formulation indi-
cates, the inapplicability of legislative omnipotence and its most 
important consequence, the possibility of unconstitutional acts, 
was common ground, accepted by those who resisted a judicial 
check on legislation. Iredell's insistence that such acts were void, 
or not law, and that judges, consistent with their obligation to 
say what the ordinary law is, were not obliged to enforce them 
proved to be unanswerable. His argument was repeated by lead-
ing judges and lawyers and it never was challenged.22 
Some of the opposition to judicial authority over legislation 
was not to the existence of the power per se but to the possibility 
of abuse. Iredell and Hamilton acknowledged this possibility and 
dismissed it on the ground that many legitimate powers were 
subject to abuse, including the judicial authority to interpret or-
dinary law. In fact during the 1790s and 1800s, the distinct and 
confined power over legislation then claimed was not abused, 
and this was a second factor that contributed to the historical 
eclipse of the Marbury of 1803. Judges in federal and state courts 
20. See SNOWISS, supra note 3, at 66-70 and 126-72 and Sylvia Snowiss, Text and 
Principle in John Marshall's Constitutional Law: The Cases of Marbury and McCulloch, 
33 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 973,985-1003 (2000). 
21. I leave this clarification and this restatement of the entire argument as my reply 
to Professor Kramer's assessment that my reading of the 1790s defenses of judicial au-
thority over legislation is "strained and unpersuasive." Kramer, supra note 4, at 33 n.114. 
For my reply to Professor Alfange's misreading of other components of my argument see 
Snowiss, supra note 20, at 977 n.21; 982 n.37; 987 n.58. 
22. In the debate over repeal of the Judiciary Act of 1801, in the wake of the Fed-
eralist-Republican conflict of the 1790s, some Republicans denied judicial authority over 
unconstitutional acts. This was a minority position even in the Republican Party and it 
never moved beyond this status. 
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routinely linked affirmation of this power with its limitation to 
acts whose invalidity was beyond doubt, and this limit was faith-
fully observed. The United States Supreme Court and state 
courts upheld practically all the legislation challenged on 
constitutional grounds, amid widespread invocation of the 
doubtful case rule.23 The handful of laws held invalid during 
these twenty years dealt with judicial powers or organization, or 
interference with trial by jury.Z4 The former was an exercise of 
concurrent review and the latter was closely related to it as well 
as the defense of first principle. 
Concurrent review was an expression of widely held expec-
tations that each branch of government would defend its own 
constitutional sphere and interpret the Constitution authorita-
tively with respect to its own operation. Concurrent review was, 
first, a manifestation of the difference in kind between funda-
mental and ordinary law. It presumed that the Constitution 
lacked an authoritative interpreter, and it achieved constitu-
tional maintenance, or enforcement, through a balance of power 
mechanism, not conventional law enforcement. Second, there 
was no agreement on the precise forms through which concur-
rent review would operate. One of the most important conse-
quences of the successful1790s defense of judicial authority over 
legislation was its regularization of concurrent review, achieved 
by channeling this review into and legitimating judicial refusal to 
enforce legislation courts decided violated constitutional provi-
sions on judicial organization. The leading cases were Kamper v. 
Hawkins, decided in Virginia in 1793, and Marbury. 25 Both in-
23. See Hylton v. United States; 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 
Dall.) 386 (1798); Cooper v. Telfair, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 14 (1800); State v. _, 2 N.C. 28 
(1794); Respublica v. Duquet, 2 Yeates 493 (Pa. 1799); State v. Parkhurst, 9 N.J.L. 427 
(1802); Whittington v. Polk, 1 Harr. & J. 236 (Md. 1802); Emerich v. Harris, 1 Binn. 416 
(Pa. 1808); Grimball v. Ross, 1 Ga. Reports 175 (1808); Jackson v. Griswold, 5 Johns 139 
(NY 1809). 
24. Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792) (judicial powers); VanHorne's Les-
see v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304 (1795) (jury trial); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 
Cranch) 137, 176 (1803) (judicial organization); Kamper v. Hawkins, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 
20 (1793) (judicial organization); Stidger v. Rogers, 2 Ky. 52 (1801) (jury trial); White v. 
Kendrick, 1 Brev. 469 (S.C. 1805) (jury trial). The Supreme Court also held a state stat-
ute to be in conflict with a treaty and thereby invalid under the Supremacy Clause. Ware 
v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796). The only act invalidated on grounds other than 
judicial organization or interference with trial by jury in a state court during this period, 
of which I am aware, was a North Carolina statute that repealed a previous act designat-
ing certain funds for support of the university. Repeal was held to be a deprivation of 
property in violation of the "law of the land" clause of the North Carolina constitution. 
North Carolina v. Foy, 5 N.C. 58 (1805). 
25. See SNOWISS, supra note 3, at 83-85 (discussing how Kamper v. Hawkins, 3 Va. 
(1 Va. Cas.) 20 (1793), regularized concurrent review). 
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terpreted constitutional provisions on judicial organization and 
both were part of ongoing conflict between the legislature and 
the courts. Concurrent review, lastly, required judicial finality on 
the meaning of constitutional provisions on judicial power and 
the doubtful case rule was thereby inapplicable. Marbury's exer-
cise of concurrent review and its ignoring of the rule did not con-
travene existing expectations and these aspects of the case did 
not draw criticism at the time it was decided. 
A third and critical reason we have failed to recognize the 
Marbury of 1803 was the speed with which the conditions that 
had given rise to it disappeared. Fidelity to the doubtful case rule 
is testimony to the disappearance of legislative irresponsibility 
and with it, waning of the fear that popular government would 
not respect established limits. The speed with which this fear 
disappeared is evident from the rapid emergence in the 1790s of 
a new and opposite one, that of autocratic national government 
too far removed from popular control. This fear, in turn, ebbed 
with the Republican Party victory in 1800. The speed with which 
both disappeared is evidence that both were exaggerated, and 
revealed the breadth and depth of American commitment to 
limited, republican government. This commitment does not 
mean it would have been impossible to lose or perfect both. But 
it does mean that the occasion and main motive to use this new 
judicial power disappeared at precisely the same time that ques-
tions about its legitimacy were removed. This status was cap-
tured in Justice Chase's opinion in Cooper v. Telfair, decided in 
the Supreme Court in 1800.26 In the course of declining to invali-
date anti-loyalist legislation that partook of willful violation of 
established principle Chase noted the "material difference be-
tween laws passed by the individual states, during the revolution, 
and laws passed subsequent to the organization of the federal 
constitution. Few of the revolutionary acts," he indicated, 
"would stand the rigorous test now applied." Chase then turned 
to the power of courts over unconstitutional acts, following the 
standard two parts through which the question was considered: 
"and although it is alleged that all acts of the legislature, in direct 
opposition to the prohibitions of the constitution, would be void; 
yet, it remains a question, where the power resides to declare it 
void?" Chase's formulation betrays a hesitancy about the an-
swer, but it nevertheless gave the standard one: "it is ... a gen-
eral opinion, it is expressly admitted by all this bar, and some of 
26. 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 14. 
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the Judges have, individually, in the Circuits, decided, that the 
Supreme Court can declare an act of congress to be unconstitu-
tional, and therefore, invalid; but there is no adjudication of the 
Supreme Court itself upon ..the point.'m Chase's comments cap-
tured the crucial elements ·of the Marbury of 1803: they reaf-
firmed the initial seriousness of concededly unconstitutional acts, 
testified to the demise of such acts, and recorded the support 
achieved for judicial authority over unconstitutional acts. 
This authority now had a peculiar status. By 1800 it had 
achieved a life of its own, separated from the circumstances that 
had brought it into being. As Chase's comments indicated those 
circumstances were now reduced from a potentially chronic 
problem to a self-contained historical episode. With that, the 
dominant inclination in federal and state courts in the first 
twenty years under the new Constitution was not to use what, 
despite its legitimacy, was still an irregular judicial power. At the 
same time, non-use was accompanied by repeated, emphatic re-
assertion of this legitimacy, a pattern particularly striking in the 
state courts.28 The invalidation of legislation in Marbury did not 
disturb the general disinclination to invalidate legislation, as it 
was part of concurrent review. 
It is conventionally said that the Court in Marbury deliber-
ately invalidated trivial legislation to set a precedent for judicial 
review, and thereby to bolster the power of the judiciary in its 
confrontation with the Republican Congress and President. This 
assertion of power, the argument continues, was especially im-
portant in light of the Supreme Court's decision not to invalidate 
the more important and more constitutionallis vulnerable legisla-
tion that repealed the Judiciary Act of 1801. 9 A lot of the argu-
ment about the strategic value of Marbury is from the perspec-
tive of modern judicial review, and I urge caution in drawing 
conclusions. The evidence is exceedingly strong that the Court 
went out of its way, in its statutory and constitutional interpreta-
tions in Marbury, to declare Section 13 unconstitutional. But I 
am more persuaded by James O'Fallon's explanation for this 
behavior than by the conventional one. O'Fallon argued that the 
Court was seeking to forestall a potential future congressional 
attack in the form of an increase in original jurisdiction "de-
27. /d. at 19. 
28. See Respublica v. Duquet, 2 Yeates 493 (Pa. 1799), State v. Parkhurst, 9 N.J.L. 
427 (1802), Whittington v. Polk, 1 Harr. & J. 236 (Md. 1802), Emerich v. Harris, 1 Binn. 
416 (Pa. 1808), Gimbal! v. Ross, 1 Ga. Reports 175 (1808). 
29. See Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299 (1803). 
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signed to overwhelm the Court with trivial cases," and to ease 
Federalist justices off the Court. O'Fallon noted that Kamper v. 
Hawkins, which also dealt with a conflict between the legislature 
and the judiciary, and explicitly with judicial workload, was then 
fresh in Marshall's mind.30 I do not dismiss the possibility that 
the Court was also seeking to set a precedent for judicial invali-
dation of legislation. But it is significant that neither the invali-
dation of Section 13 nor the defense of this power in Marbury 
was subject to contemporary criticism. This reflected the wide-
spread acceptance of this defense, especially as applied in con-
current review. 
In thinking about the meaning of Marbury it is instructive to 
consider how it would have been possible for so many leading 
legal figures to have repeated as patently defective an argument 
as is the modern Marbury; how such a defective argument could 
have muted controversy over judicial power over legislation; 
how it escaped the obvious criticism for thirty-five years; and 
why that criticism emerged when it did.31 We have grown so 
comfortable with the defects and anomalies of Marbury that we 
do not ask these questions. The answer to all of them is that the 
1790s formulations, including that in Marbury, did not make the 
argument we assume it to have made. 
The Marbury of 1803 did have one major problem, but it 
was not one of internal logic. Its problem was whether any court 
could in fact prevent the dominant social and political forces 
from unambiguous violation of constitutional principle. The 
1790s defenses did not address this problem directly. But they 
did understand, with an immediacy lost to us by two centuries of 
stable politics and the legalization of fundamental law, that the 
attempt to limit sovereign power under fundamental law is an 
enterprise different in kind from the control of individual behav-
ior under ordinary law. Accordingly, they understood that the 
judicial check on legislation operated as a substitute for revolu-
30. James M. O'Fallon, Marbury, 44 STAN. L. REV. 255 (1992). 
31. I am referring, of course, to Judge Gibson's critique of Marbury in Eakin v. 
Raub, 1 Serg. & Rawle 330, 343 (Pa. 1825) (dissenting opinion). Gibson identified what 
remains the central defect of the modern Marbury, failure to say why the judicial inter-
pretation of the Constitution should be the authoritative one: "if (the constitution] were 
to come into collision with an act of the legislature, that latter would have to give way; 
this is conceded. But it is a fallacy, to suppose, that they can come into collision before the 
judiciary." !d. at 346-47 (emphasis in original). By 1825 key features of modern practice, 
particularly invalidation of legislation whose unconstitutionality was arguable, were al-
ready visible in the contract clause cases. For discussion of the extent to which Gibson's 
reading of Marbury was largely, but not completely, the modern one, see SNOWISS, supra 
note 3. at 177-83. 
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tion rather than conventional law enforcement. The fullest (and 
most florid) statement to this effect that I have found was in an 
1808 case decided in Georgia, in which the Court strongly reaf-
firmed judicial authority over unconstitutional acts, while up-
holding the challenged legislation under the doubtful case rule: 
From passion, from unprinciple[ d] ambition, from the illu-
sions of ignorance, from the ebullitions of political acrimony 
or misguided zeal, it is very easy to perceive the possibility of 
an unconstitutional act of the legislature. What then is the 
remedy? A recourse to the people's vengeance? Must the 
people be called upon to defend in their aggregate capacity, 
that compact and those privileges which flowed directly from 
the source of their volition? If this is the remedy, our boasted 
republicanism is nothing more than systematical anarchy .... 
Is the remedy found in a patient endurance of the evil, until 
succeeding legislatures think proper to repeal the unconstitu-
tional edict? This would be worse than an appeal to popular 
insurrection .... [I]t preupposes an acquiescence in an out-
rage upon the constitutional rights, longer than ought to be 
borne by American citizens. The remedy can only be 
found ... in the wisdom and independency of the judicial de-
partment. 32 
This is the same thought expressed by Hamilton in Federal-
ist 78 when he argued that "the courts were designed to be an in-
termediate body between the people and the legislature ... to 
keep the latter within the limits assigned to their authority." 
However, neither of these formulations, nor those of other par-
ticipants in this discussion, considered Madison's observation 
that in a wholly republican regime the greatest threat to constitu-
tional limits was not from an unfaithful legislature but from "acts 
in which the government is the mere instrument of the major 
number of the constituents. "33 As the threat posed to established 
rights by popular politics lapsed over the 1790s, defenders of a 
judicial check were not forced to confront the implications of 
this observation. 
It is hard to read Marbury today as a substitute for revolu-
tion. But the basic relationships have not changed. Courts can 
always enforce ordinary law against individual violation because 
in so doing they function as the agent of societal force. In fun-
damental law they are the agent of principle the community once 
32. Grimball v. Ross, 1 Ga. Reports 175, 176-77 {1808). 
33. James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, (October 17, 1788), in 5 THE WRITINGS 
OF JAMES MADISON, 272 {Gaillard Hunted., 1904). 
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accepted but was now willing to violate. Enforcement depends 
on the capacity to rally the community to return to first princi-
ples. In any given case a court may succeed. But it cannot suc-
ceed routinely as it does in ordinary law. We have only to reflect 
that when tested by unambiguous violation courts have, in fact, 
not been able to enforce the Constitution. They failed African-
Americans for over a half-century after enactment of the Four-
teenth and Fifteenth Amendments and Japanese-Americans in 
World War II. And for all the talk about constitutional law's role 
as a limit on majority will, we know from the history of constitu-
tional law that courts can impose no limit on majority will the 
majority is not willing to accept. 
The victory Bickel invoked in Least Dangerous Branch is 
that of the modern Marbury. In it the Constitution is presumed 
to be supreme ordinary law, different from that law only in de-
gree, and included within that law for which it is the province 
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. The 
modern Marbury, and the Constitution's status as supreme, or-
dinary law, are the products of an evolutionary process whose 
most significant dimension is that it took place in the absence of 
discussion and conscious recognition of the transformations tak-
ing place. In Judicial Review and the Law of the Constitution I 
attributed legalization of fundamental law solely to Chief Justice 
Marshall's unacknowledged actions, particularly application of 
the rules for statutory interpretation to the Constitution in the 
contract clause cases. Gordon Wood and Larry Kramer have ar-
gued that the unacknowledged actions of a single individual 
could not have effectuated a transformation of this magnitude.34 
They are right. I have since indicated some of the other factors 
and conditions that contributed to legalization,35 and I am still 
working on a more complete account. But I have not changed 
my position that legalization was achieved through an unrecog-
nized evolutionary process in which Marshall's deliberate but 
unacknowledged efforts were of major significance. 
Although I cannot here defend this claim properly, I can 
call attention to several aspects of American constitutional de-
velopment, inadequately explained by conventional accounts, 
34. Gordon S. Wood, Judicial Review in the Era of the Founding, in ROBERT A. 
LiCHT, IS THE SUPREME COURT THE GUARDIAN OF THE CONSTITUTION 164 (1993); 
Kramer, supra note 4, at 90 n.375. 
35. Snowiss, supra note 20, at 1003-07; Sylvia Snowiss, The Constitution as Law: 
Problems and Paradox, in LE DROIT DANS LA CULTURE AMERICAINE, 84-93 (Philippe 
Raynaud and Elisabeth Zoller eds., Editions Pantheon-Assas 2001). 
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but consistent with an unrecognized transformation of Marbury 
and fundamental law. First, the judicial review that actually took 
place in the Supreme Court in the first half of the nineteenth 
century did not need Marbury. The laws overturned were exclu-
sively state legislation and this jurisdiction was authorized by Ar-
ticle VI of the Constitution and Section 25 of the Judiciary Act 
of 1789. Second, Marbury was rarely cited in the Supreme Court 
during the nineteenth century and even more rarely as a prece-
dent for invalidation of legislation.36 Lastly, judicial review in the 
state courts in the first half of the nineteenth century was de-
fense of the principle of vested rights, not the practice associated 
with the modern Marbury.37 Marbury was not cited on the Su-
preme Court as a precedent for judicial invalidation of legisla-
tion until 188738 and was not regularly linked to this authority in 
legal and political commentary until roughly the same time.39 By 
this time access to the Marbury of 1803 had long been totally 
lost, while the case had been largely invisible.40 At the same 
time, from 1810 in the Supreme Court and a little later in the 
state courts invalidation of legislation had become a fairly regu-
lar practice, one that very early lost key properties associated 
with the original judicial check on legislation. When Marbury re-
emerged it did so with substantially the meaning we now give it, 
one that reflected and rationalized nineteenth century practice. 
The modern Marbury and the presumptions on which it was 
based were read back into an obliging text, albeit at the cost of 
its well known defects. In the process, the relatively uncompli-
cated finality associated with the judicial responsibility in ordi-
nary law became the judicial supremacy that is the contentious 
core of modern constitutional law. 
It is tempting to say that the modern Marbury and the le-
galization of fundamental law were the products of evolutionary 
processes familiar in common law, and that however it achieved 
its current status the Constitution is now supreme, ordinary law. 
On one level this is obviously the case. A conclusion of this sort 
36. See ROBERT L. CLINTON, MARBURY V. MADISON AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 117-
21 (1989). 
37. See Edward S. Corwin, The Basic Doctrine of American Constitutional Law, 12 
MICH. L. REV. 247 {1914). 
38. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623,661. 
39. CLINTON, supra note 36, chap. 10. 
40. I cannot fix a precise date for loss of access to the Marbury of 1803. Chase's 
opinion in Cooper v. Telfair, in 1800, reflected such access. Gibson's critique of Marbury 
in Eakin v. Raub, in 1825, revealed loss of access to its most important dimensions but 
not assumption of all the presumptions of the modern Marbury. See supra note 31. 
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is implicit in Bickel's celebration of Marbury's victory, and in 
constitutional theory's embrace of Marbury on these terms. Con-
temporary constitutional theory accepts the two components of 
Marbury's victory-judicial authority to determine unconstitu-
tionality in doubtful cases and the Constitution's status as su-
preme, ordinary law. It acknowledges the tension generated by 
constitutional law for democratic responsibility and separation 
of powers but regards these problems as not essentially different 
from unresolved problems considered in legal theory generally. 
I would have no quarrel with this conclusion if constitu-
tional theory were not at the impasse at which it now stands, and 
if retrieving the original distinctions could not give us valuable 
insight into this impasse. The lesson I draw from retrieval is that 
constitutional theory needs to separate itself in crucial ways from 
legal theory. Alternatively stated, constitutional theory needs to 
separate the two parts of Marbury's victory. Judicial determina-
tions of unconstitutionality in doubtful cases is now a given, 
sanctioned by the unwritten constitution. It can always lose this 
sanction through the forms of the written or unwritten constitu-
tion, but there is no indication it will do so in the foreseeable fu-
ture. The Constitution, however, does not function as does ordi-
nary law and it cannot be made to do so by acceptance, however 
pervasive. Ineradicable differences in kind between fundamental 
and ordinary law, independent of any historical account of the 
legalization of fundamental law, necessarily remain within con-
temporary practice. Constitutional law has easily adopted the 
means and methods of ordinary law but these are not at the ser-
vice of ordinary law's purpose or function. Here I will concen-
trate on constitutional law's unreflective adoption of ordinary 
law's enforcement function and the distortions produced by its 
inappropriate application to fundamental law. 
The starting point is that any law or restraint on sovereign 
power is and must be different in kind from that addressed to in-
dividuals, or even delegated power. Restraints directed at sover-
eign power are necessarily made in contemplation of obedience, 
whereas those directed at individuals are made in contemplation 
of violation. The former is a single actor, the legislature.41 If it 
were to violate the Constitution with the regularity with which 
41. I will limit this discussion to the central relationship of judicial review, that be-
tween the Constitution and legislation. Many of the same considerations apply to the ex-
ercise of presidential power. I defer to another time discussion of the Fourth Amend-
ment which speaks directly to police officers, who are not a single actor, and of 
constitutional restraints on delegated power. 
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some individuals violate ordinary law, the regime would col-
lapse. Real constitutional violations must be rare, too rare to sus-
tain any regular practice of enforcement. In addition, as noted 
above, the judiciary can always enforce ordinary law because it 
functions as the agent of societal force directed at individual law-
breakers. In attempting to enforce fundamental law against the 
real constitutional violation the judiciary is the agent of a re-
straint the dominant forces of society once accepted but have 
shown themselves willing to violate. Among the consequences of 
constitutional law's unreflective adoption of ordinary law's en-
forcement function has been identification of enforcement with 
legislation invalidated in court, at the same time that we ignore 
the necessarily rare unambiguous violations courts proved too 
weak to counter. These were, again, the denial of elementary 
due process, literal protection of the laws, and voting rights to 
African-Americans for more than half a century following adop-
tion of the Civil War amendments, and of due process to Japa-
nese-Americans in World War II. 
At risk of overstatement I will say that a constitution is a 
kind of law that in its nature is either self-enforcing or unen-
forceable. That ordinary law is, in fact, overwhelmingly self-
enforcing does not undermine the difference between it and 
fundamental law. For the judiciary exists for, and its work is 
shaped by, the repeated, ongoing circumstances in which ordi-
nary law is not self-enforcing and in which authoritative resolu-
tion of conflict among individuals is indispensable for societal 
functioning. Constitutional self-enforcement, furthermore, is not 
an afterthought but a powerful and meaningful political force. It 
is what we call political stability, and its operation explains why 
societies with and without written constitutions and judicial re-
view, such as the United States and Great Britain, can produce 
roughly the same results, namely regimes of effective and limited 
government, civil liberties, and institutional stability. The 
American Constitution has been from the beginning supreme 
binding law. But for all of Marbury's stress on the written consti-
tution, with its implicit contrast to the unwritten English consti-
tution that does not bind literally, and for which the concept of 
enforcement is presumably irrelevant, a written constitution re-
mains closer to an unwritten constitution than to a statute.42 
Both are either self-enforcing or unenforceable. 
42. In this connection see David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpre-
tation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1996) and David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitu-
tional Amendments, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1457 (2001). 
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We have also been diverted from appreciating the dynamics 
of constitutional enforcement by the fact that appellate courts 
function the same way in ordinary law and in constitutional law. 
In each they deal with new, close, or doubtful cases and choose 
among contending legitimate interpretations of the relevant law. 
However, the work of appellate courts in ordinary law, particu-
larly the making of new law in hard cases, is part of a process of 
enforcing existing law and providing peaceful resolution of con-
flict in easy cases. It is, accordingly, meaningful to call this en-
forcement of existing law, however forward looking and innova-
tive it may be in practice, and however problematic it remains in 
legal theory. For a self-enforcing constitution, however, no com-
parable purpose is served by the ongoing judicial choice among 
competing legitimate interpretations. It is simply judicial law-
making. It is, furthermore, judicial law-making in which the con-
straints that narrow and discipline the inevitable law-making of 
ordinary law, such as text, intent, and reasoned, neutral, princi-
pled decision-making, do not bring comparable results in consti-
tutional law. It would not have surprised the founding genera-
tion that these legal means conceived for ordinary law, and not 
inapplicable to the Constitution, cannot bring to authoritative 
and ongoing judicial interpretation of the latter the kind of legal 
identity their use imparts to application of ordinary law. 
Constitutional scholarship is familiar with the failed at-
tempts to bring constitutional law into conformity with conven-
tional legal norms through fidelity to these ordinary law means. 
Although there is more to be said on this subject, the prior ques-
tion is that of constitutional law's end or function. A constitution 
must serve society's twin needs of preservation, or enforcement, 
of its basic commitments and their adaptation to meet ongoing 
public needs. Under the conception of the Constitution as su-
preme ordinary law constitutional theory has assigned enforce-
ment to the judiciary and adaptation to the legislature. This divi-
sion appears overtly in some theories, but operates in different 
ways and at different levels, even in theories that assign to the 
judiciary an adaptationist operation. My argument is that this 
adoption of ordinary law's enforcement function is unworkable 
for an ongoing practice under a self-enforcing Constitution. 
One way to cut into the problem is to see how different 
theories have sought constitutional enforcement by drawing se-
lectively on one of the two main components of ordinary law's 
enforcement process, either that law's relatively uncomplicated 
application against unambiguous violation in easy cases or its 
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more open ended interpretation in new and close hard cases. I 
am not suggesting that these are two mutually exclusive and 
clear-cut components in ordinary law. The point, for present 
purposes, is that ordinary law is regularly and repeatedly vio-
lated in a way that the Constitution could not bear, and that such 
acts are roughly divisible into easy and hard cases. Resolution of 
the latter remains part of a single, coherent if still problematic 
process in ordinary law. Constitutional theories, more or less 
self-consciously, have divided ordinary law's enforcement proc-
ess into these components and applied them selectively to a self-
enforcing constitution. As the following review indicates, rather 
than imparting to judicial review a legal identity, reliance on or-
dinary law's enforcement model has culminated either in theo-
ries that require the abandonment of judicial review or that ex-
acerbate constitutional law's political attributes. 
James Bradley Thayer's reasonableness rule is the proto-
type of a theory that sought to legalize constitutional law by 
making it conform to that part of ordinary law's enforcement 
model directed to unambiguous violation in easy cases.43 This is 
the burden of Thayer's insistence that judges should defer sys-
tematically to any reasonable or legitimate interpretation of the 
Constitution embodied in challenged legislation and reserve in-
validation for the "clear mistake." Fidelity to such a requirement 
can only culminate in the end of judicial review. Constitutional 
violations, for one thing, are not "mistakes," or legal errors. 
They are high-stakes, self-conscious, political actions as in the 
willful denial of rights to African-Americans, or in Lincoln's 
subordination of the claims of individual liberty to the military 
needs of the union. Secondly, and decisively, no regime that 
produced enough instances of unambiguous violation to sustain 
an ongoing practice could survive in recognizable form. As we 
know, it was Thayer's reasonableness rule that atrophied, not 
judicial review. The rule did not disappear because of a demon-
strated weakness in Thayer's argument. On the contrary, his po-
sition gained the support of leading scholars and judges and until 
Justice Frankfurter's retirement from the Court it monopolized 
opposition to active judicial review. Atrophy of systematic def-
erence is another way to express Marbury's victory. 
The ultimate atrophy of the reasonableness rule is less in-
teresting than what its widespread acceptance for over fifty years 
43. James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Con-
stitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 144 (1893). 
250 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 20:231 
tells us about the legalization of fundamental law. Neither 
Thayer nor his supporters, it is important to note, called for the 
end of judicial review. For them, systematic deference was a way 
of practicing it, not ending it. We need to ask a variant of the 
question Laurence Tribe posed to process theorists in 1980: why 
did thoughtful judges and scholars from Thayer to Frankfurter 
not see the impossibility of a practice devoted to enforcement of 
the Constitution against unambiguous violation? The answer lies 
in the process of legalization through which the Constitution ab-
sorbed ordinary law attributes in the absence of recognition or 
critical reflection. 
Alexander Bickel's work illustrates in another way the hold 
and the unworkability for constitutional law of ordinary law's 
enforcement model as manifested in easy cases. By 1962, when 
Bickel wrote, practice had forced recognition that constitutional 
provisions were more intelligible as general principle than stan-
dard legal text. Bickel was among the first to make this point and 
this reconceptualization of text has been widely accepted. The 
contentious aspect of Bickel's position was his further argument 
that judicial defense of principle involved its adaptation in terms 
of contemporary values. Bickel, however, soon shrank back from 
active judicial implementation of contemporary values in dis-
comfort with its legislative attributes. This response plus the cen-
trality of Brown v. Board of Education in Bickel's initial state-
ment indicates that he was comfortable with judicial 
implementation of principle in terms of contemporary values 
only against its unambiguous violation. Brown was such a case, 
addressing the willful and blatant denial of racial equality that 
remains this country's most serious constitutional violation. But 
there can no more be a regular practice devoted to the flouting 
of principle of this clarity than there can be for Thayer's clear 
mistake. As Bickel's life's work indicates, to reserve judicial re-
view for the unambiguous violation, however conceived, is not to 
legalize judicial review but to end it. 
Originalism's failure to provide viable guidance for the 
practice of judicial review is another variation on the same 
theme. As a product of the 1970s and 1980s, originalism accepts 
the conception of constitutional provisions as general principle. 
In a straightforward application of ordinary law means and ends 
it assigns adaptation of principle in terms of contemporary val-
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ues to the legislature and enforcement of original values to the 
judiciary.44 
As did Thayer, originalism presents itself as a way to prac-
tice judicial review, not to end it. And like Thayer's reasonable-
ness rule, fidelity to its requirements can lead only to atrophy of 
the practice. To meet its professed aim of avoiding personal ju-
dicial value choices, originalism must restrict invalidation of leg-
islation to the defense of original values against their unambigu-
ous violation, comparable to the hypothetical examples given in 
Marbury. Otherwise, the self-enforcing constitution makes 
originalism the judicial rejection of social and political reform 
embodied in new legislation in the name of values once widely 
held but not constitutionalized. 
Originalism has not formally capitulated but it has demon-
strably failed to provide effective guidance for an ongoing judi-
cial review. It is a coherent doctrine in the context which brought 
it into being-as a critique of the law-making connected with the 
invalidation of old governmental practices as violations of newly 
reinterpreted constitutional principles. But so applied original-
ism supports sustaining, not invalidating legislation. At some 
level, originalist justices understand the theory's inability to sup-
port invalidation of legislation as they have not relied on its 
principles in overturning important new legislation.45 
Ronald Dworkin's constitutional law is the most highly de-
veloped theory to draw on that component of ordinary law's en-
forcement process in which courts resolve the new, close, and 
doubtful case. Dworkin accepted and generalized Bickel's un-
derstanding that constitutional provisions are principles whose 
"enforcement" required adaptation in terms of contemporary 
values.46 Dworkin also characterized constitutional limits as 
moral restraints and acknowledged that judicial defense of such 
restraints rested in historic acceptance of judicial review, not 
these provisions' status as law.47 In so doing, he acknowledged 
44. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989). 
45. The clearest example is Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in Richmond v. Cro-
son, 488 U.S. 469, 520 (1989), holding unconstitutional an affirmative action plan for local 
business with no attempt to link this holding to original values. The Rehnquist Court's 
federalism jurisprudence is originalist in the sense that its invalidation of legislation rests 
on older practices and values. But even here opinions qualify originalist claims. See, for 
example, Justice Scalia in Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918 and 925 (1997) and 
Justice Thomas in Federal Maritime Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 753-
55 (2002). 
46. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, 132-37 (1977). 
47. RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE 
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differences in kind between fundamental and ordinary law. But 
this acknowledgment did not disturb Dworkin's assimilation of 
judicial defense of moral principle to the enforcement of ordi-
nary law. Constitutional rights are understood as an extension of 
ordinary legal rights to be enforced through the same means and 
with the same regularity with which courts enforce the latter.48 
Dworkin's critics argue that his constitutional law is legisla-
tive in character and they are correct. As we have seen, however 
we understand the inevitable law-making connected to judicial 
defense of ordinary legal rights, it remains enforcement of exist-
ing law serving agreed-upon societal ends. For a self-enforcing 
constitution judicial finality in the new, close, and hard case is 
simply law-making. Dworkin's constitutional law- making is also 
of much greater consequence than that attending implementa-
tion of ordinary legal rights. The latter are numerous, with rela-
tively minor public policy consequences or innovation following 
from implementation in particular cases. Constitutional rights 
are few and portentous, and their implementation in new con-
texts carries with it the most important commitments of collec-
tive life. Enforcement of constitutional rights on the model of 
ordinary legal rights also contains a predetermined result. It pre-
commits the Constitution to an individualist reading beyond that 
fairly contained within it as a statement of common purpose. In 
its most recent implementation, enforcement of constitutional 
rights was also a precommitment to policies of social reform. 
Overturning long-standing governmental practices in the name 
of contemporary values is the inverse of the judicial rejection of 
reform built into originalism. These predetermined results un-
dermine the legal identity of both. 
Bruce Ackerman's dualist democracl9 is another constitu-
tional theory that draws on that part of ordinary law's enforce-
ment model as it operates in the new and close case. Dualist de-
mocracy contains an elaborate reconstruction of democratic and 
constitutional theory and an innovative rereading of American 
history. One central conclusion from this reconstruction is that 
popular and institutional acceptance of the expansion of national 
power in the New Deal is to be understood as a constitutional 
amendment. This amendment, as all major ones, Ackerman con-
tinued, necessitates an intergenerational synthesis of the com-
AMERICAN CONSTITUTI0:-.1, 32-35 (1996). 
48. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, chaps. 8-10 (1986 ). 
49. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991). 
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mitments contained in the newly amended Constitution. Acker-
man's synthesis culminates in a reading of the Supreme Court's 
defense of racial equality in Brown v. Board of Education, and 
of personal privacy in Griswold v. Connecticut, as "preservation-
ist" decisions.50 Here again is the unquestioned reliance on ordi-
nary law's enforcement model and its assumption that courts in 
constitutional law can and can only enforce existing law. 
Ackerman has been no more persuasive than Dworkin in 
turning the judicial adaptation of principle into the enforcement 
of existing law. Ackerman's problem would persist in identical 
form even if the New Deal innovations had included an amend-
ment explicitly augmenting congressional power over the econ-
omy. His problem is not whether or not we accept the "possibil-
ity of interpretation"51 but the different ends served by 
authoritative interpretation in ordinary and fundamental law. 
Again, the former serves the intelligible, indispensable, and 
agreed upon one of literal law enforcement. Constitutional law 
and constitutional theory have yet even to ask exactly what end 
is served by ongoing, authoritative judicial interpretation of the 
Constitution. 
Ackerman's work is creative and provocative, and more 
than that of any other theorist captures essential differences in 
kind between fundamental and ordinary law. His discussions of 
the Constitution's extra-legal attributes and of intergenerational 
synthesis reflect ways in which a written constitution is closer to 
an unwritten one than to a statute, and capture the breadth of 
adaptation to which, in its nature, it is properly subject. Yet in 
ultimately subordinating these attributes to ordinary law's en-
forcement end it culminated in another failed theory. 
I said at the beginning that retrieval of the original distinc-
tions is a necessary preliminary to better constitutional theory. 
That preliminary inheres in recognizing what fundamental law is 
not. This is Larry Kramer's phrase,52 used in arguing that my dis-
cussion of the original distinctions had addressed only this ques-
tion and failed to give an account of what fundamental law was. 
As indicated above, I believe I did answer that question with re-
spect to the founding era, although perhaps not yet as fully as 
necessary. But I have not here given any account of what fun-
damental law is today, and this is the central question for mod-
50. !d. at 140. 
51. !d. chap. 6. 
52. Kramer. supra note 4, at 33 n.ll4. 
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ern constitutional law. Elsewhere I suggested that this law is bet-
ter understood as part of a new institutional form or a new form 
of law, rather than as an extension of common and statutory law. 
In its evolutionary development the Constitution lost key prop-
erties of fundamental law as inherently constituted without being 
able to take on those of supreme ordinary law. As a new form of 
law its ends and means need to be consciously constructed and 
defended. I also indicated what the ends and means of such a 
new form of law might look like.53 I regard these as tentative 
formulations, offered to stimulate thinking about constitutional 
law as a new form of law. To assess its soundness, or that of any 
other conception of fundamental law, it is necessary to appreci-
ate, more fully than is yet the case, what fundamental law is not. 
53. Snowiss, supra note 20, at 1016-20. 
